Globalisation critics are concerned that increased trade openness and foreign direct investment exacerbate existing economic disadvantages of women and foster conditions for forced labour. Defenders of globalisation argue instead that as countries become more open and competition intensifies, discrimination against any group, including women, becomes more difficult to sustain and is therefore likely to recede. The same is argued with respect to forced labour. This article puts these competing claims to an empirical test. We find that countries that are more open to trade provide better economic rights to women and have a lower incidence of forced labour. This effect holds in a global sample as well as in a developing country sub-sample and holds also when potential feedback effects are controlled via instrumental variable regression. The extent of an economy's 'penetration' by foreign direct investment by and large has no statistically significant impact. Globalisation might weaken the general bargaining position of labour such that outcome-related labour standards might suffer. However, being more open toward trade is likely to promote rather than hinder the realisation of two labour rights considered as core or fundamental by the International Labour Organisation, namely the elimination of economic discrimination and of forced labour.
INTRODUCTION
F EMINISTS and women's interest groups are concerned that globalisation increases the existing economic disadvantage experienced by many women relative to men in most countries of the world (Afshar and Barrientos, 1999; Benería and Feldman, 1992; Ça g atay, 1996; Elson, 1999; Elson and Pearson, 1989; Tinker, 1990; and Visvanathan et al., 1997) . Similarly, groups concerned about sex-slavery and non-governmental organisations with a focus on human rights and equitable development are concerned that the competitive pressures wrought by globalisation increases the incidence of forced or compulsory labour (Bales, 1999; and United Nations, 2000) . What both groups have in common is the concern that globalisation is detrimental for what are called core or fundamental labour rights. Others argue that these rights improve with increasing globalisation (Bhagwati, 2004; and Graham, 2000) .
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has declared four labour rights as core or fundamental, despite some dispute over exactly which standards should be included in this category. The 'ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work' commits all ILO members, not just parties to the ILO conventions, to promote and to realise: The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Eric Neumayer acknowledges financial support from the Leverhulme Trust.
In this article, we address fundamental labour rights that relate to economic discrimination against women and the incidence of forced or compulsory labour. Discrimination against women is of course not the only form of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, but it is an issue with wide-reaching consequences for development, since empowerment of women is widely seen to be an end in itself as well as a means to development (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004) . Moreover, the issue may now be addressed systematically since sufficiently well-developed data exist. Equal pay for women for their work of equal value is also the explicit objective of the ILO's Equal Renumeration Convention (No. 100) from 1951. The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111) from 1958, on the other hand, is more general both in terms of substantive scope reaching beyond wage payments and in terms of groups of people covered. In addition to sex discrimination, this convention also prohibits discrimination based on race, colour, political opinion, nationality or social origin. Elimination of discrimination is also specifically mentioned in voluntary codes for multinational companies, such as the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy or the United Nations' Global Compact project (see Lozano and Boni, 2002) .
Compulsory or forced labour comes in many forms. ILO (2001) classifies such labour into eight categories: slavery and abduction, compulsory participation in public works, coercive recruitment practices in agriculture and remote rural areas, bonded domestic work, debt bondage, exaction of forced labour by the military, trafficking for sexual and economic exploitation and, lastly, prison labour. This form of labour exaction can thus be imposed by either a state or by private economic agents for commercial gain. ILO (2005) estimates that there are between 9.8 and 14.8 million forced labourers worldwide that fall into one of these categories.
Compulsory or forced labour had been the subject of one of the earliest ILO conventions, namely the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) from 1930. Its Article 2.1 defines 'forced or compulsory labour' as 'all work or service, which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily'. The convention calls for the elimination of forced labour, allowing only few exceptions, such as military service, service in times of emergency and minor communal services. The Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105) from 1957 supplements the older convention and is more concerned with the use of forced labour for political objectives and for purposes of suppressing demands from labour groups. The issue of forced labour received great public attention in the late 1990s when the ILO established a Commission of Inquiry into Myanmar's alleged use of forced labour following complaints from workers. In November 2000, the ILO took the extraordinary step of asking its member countries, employers and workers' organisations to re-examine and sever relationships with Myanmar due to the country's 'continued, widespread, systematic, egregious use of forced labour' (Bellace, 2001, p. 277 Existing studies on the effect of globalisation on gender-related aspects of employment have either focused on the female employment share in the labour force or the wage gap between men and women (see the next section). These are not ideal measures of economic discrimination against women. As we will argue below, an increased share of female employment following trade liberalisation need not be caused by a decrease in discrimination, need not be entirely beneficial to women, and liberalised trade is likely to increase female employment in some countries and reduce it in others. The so-called gender wage gap is a better and more direct measure of discrimination against women if one can hold other factors constant that might be responsible for the gap, such as level of education and skill endowments. But there are many forms of discrimination other than unequal pay for work of equal value. Our original contribution is to look at a measure of women's economic rights that includes the pay gap, but also covers other important aspects of gender discrimination, such as the right to work in specific circumstances, discrimination in hiring and promotion practices, freedom of choice of profession etc. (see the description of research design below for details). This is not only a measure that has hitherto not been employed in existing studies, but it is also arguably a better, more comprehensive measure of the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation against women, as required by ILO Conventions 100 and 111. As concerns our second major focus in this paper, we know of no previous study that has addressed the question of globalisation's effects on forced and compulsory labour in a rigorous way. However, it can be interpreted as an extreme form of wage discrimination and many of the arguments that relate to the economic discrimination against women can be applied to forced labour as well.
In short, our findings show that countries that are more open to trade have better economic rights for women and have a lower incidence of forced labour. This holds true in a global sample and in a sub-sample of developing countries.
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The result is robust toward tackling potential reverse causality with the help of instrumental variable regression. Our results tentatively suggest that as countries open more toward global markets and trade more relative to their gross domestic product, respect for these two aspects of core, or fundamental, labour rights improve. However, a higher penetration of the economy with foreign investment measured as the ratio of accumulated stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP) does not seem to have any impact. These findings complement our existing work, in which we have examined the effect of globalisation on the other fundamental labour rights (Neumayer and De Soysa, 2005a and 2005b) .
This article is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the various impacts that globalisation can have on women's economic rights and the incidence of forced labour. It will become apparent that there are highly plausible arguments for both beneficial and detrimental effects. Which prevails is therefore largely an empirical question. A description of the research design is followed by a presentation of results, the implications of which are discussed in the concluding section.
GLOBALISATION, DISCRIMINATION AND FORCED LABOUR
An extension to traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-type trade theory predicts that trade liberalisation will increase female employment in developing countries. Countries will expand the production of goods that are intensive in factors, which are abundantly available. In developing countries this is a large supply of relatively unskilled labourers. Partly because of prior discrimination in education and due to social and cultural restrictions on female employment opportunities, women represent the bulk of unskilled labourers. Traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory takes factor supplies as fixed. Relaxing this assumption, as developing countries expand their production of goods that can be manufactured without highly developed skills and without much training in such sectors as electronics assembly, textiles, apparel, tanning and leather goods, women's participation in the workforce is likely to increase. Globalisation is certainly not the only factor behind the sharp rise in female employment in developing countries over the last several decades, but most studies agree that the increased integration of developing countries into the world economy has been an important factor (Fontana et al., 1998; and Tzannatos, 1999) .
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These effects of globalisation on women's economic activity have not been entirely beneficial, however. First, trade theory predicts as well that developed countries will see a contraction of production in corresponding economic sectors, which likely affect women most due to the high share of female employment in these sectors. This is indeed what most empirical studies find, with the exception of Wood (1991) -see Kucera and Milberg (2000) . The gains in female employment in developing countries might have thus come to some extent at the expense of female employment losses in developed countries. Traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory would suggest that women are merely reallocated to different economic sectors, but if the labour market is distorted and subject to a multitude of restrictions, then this might not happen. Second, in developing country economies that are predominantly agrarian, globalisation has often meant a shift toward cash crop production for exports together with increased competition for food crops, a shift that adversely affects women who are predominantly employed in small non-export-oriented farms (Ça g atay and Ertürk, 2004, p. 21) . Also, a high rate of female participation in agriculture and household work need not go hand in hand with autonomy to choose professions (Morrisson and Jütting, 2005) . Third, without a more equal sharing of unpaid domestic work, women's overall work burden is likely to increase as they take up paid employment (Fontana and Wood, 2000) . Fourth, some argue that the female employment expansion was only possible because women took up low-paid, insecure, casual jobs with poor working conditions (Ça g atay and Ertürk, 2004; and Standing, 1999) . Thus, more employment of women as a share of total labour in developing countries may not mean women's status or welfare improved in any meaningful way, either in absolute terms or relative to men (see Elson, 1999 , for a general review of such arguments).
Inasmuch as women's wages are lower than those of men for work of equal value, this effect will show up in the gender wage gap, to which we now turn. For similar reasons as for the increase in the female employment share, traditional Stolper-Samuelson-type trade theory would predict that women's wages would tend to go up in developing countries. This is because an increase in demand for goods intensive in unskilled labour will increase the remuneration to unskilled labour. In developing countries, discrimination against girls and women typically leave them disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment such that they have fewer skills than men.
Modernisation theorists (often instructed by neoliberal economic theories) see greater contact between the rich and poor as beneficial for the poor since forces of modernisation lead to the breakdown of traditional values and practices such as patriarchy and discrimination of women, leading to greater emancipation (Inglehart, 1988; and Lerner, 1958) . Since cultural values may hinder the emancipation of women, the education of girls, and affect fertility rates in particular, some societies are likely to remain trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, which in turn induces further marginalisation because these values hinder the globalisation of these economies (Harrison and Huntington, 2000) . Thus, modernisation requires globalisation and vice versa, which certain cultural traits in some societies may prevent, working particularly through the disempowering effects of culture on women's role in society (Donno and Russett, 2004) .
Critics argue, however, that far from being an emancipatory force, globalisation and economic discrimination of women go hand in hand. Dependency and world-systems theorists regard the contact between rich and poor as exploitative, reinforcing dependent patterns of development, both between countries and within. These theorists blame greater trade integration and the activities of MNCs that spread capitalist modes of production in 'peripheral countries' as a source of intensified exploitation of women. Women are subjected to greater subordination, increasing their overall burden with few rewards (Griffin and Gurley, 1985; Mies et al., 1988; and Momsen, 1991) . Ward (1984, p. 3), for example, maintains that 'the intrusion of the world-system through foreign investment from and trade dependency on core nations has operated to reduce women's status relative to men's', the reason being that 'men and the TNCs [transnational corporations] often define women's proper roles as reproducers and unpaid subsistence labourers within the domestic sphere' (for a similar argument, see Chafetz, 1984, p. 66) . Critics also argue that increased competition due to globalisation will diminish the bargaining power of wage labourers. In a desperate attempt to remain competitive in the face of cut-throat competition from many other locations in the global marketplace, wages need to be kept down, or so the argument goes. This could affect women more if they work mainly in sectors that are heavily affected by foreign competition (Berik et al., 2004) . However, while these effects can change the relative wages paid to women and thereby affect the general gender wage gap, it does not mean that the discrimination-based gender wage gap is affected, as the latter refers to the differential wages that are paid to women relative to men for work of equal value. For example, Artecona and Cunningham (2002) show that the gender wage gap increased in the Mexican manufacturing sector during the trade liberalisation period 1987 to 1993, but once skill differentials and general economic changes were taken into account, trade liberalisation actually reduced the discrimination-based gender wage gap, even though the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance.
Following the path-breaking work of Becker (1957) , economists argue that a discrimination-based gender wage gap can exist if (predominantly male) employers have a taste for discrimination. However, since employers either fail to pay female employees their full marginal product or pay men more than their marginal product, satisfying their taste for discrimination will incur some economic cost on them. Becker argues that it becomes more difficult to indulge in tastes for discrimination as competition increases, which punishes all forms of wasteful economic behaviour (capitalists like higher profits). Inasmuch as trade liberalisation and the entrance of foreign investors steps up the competitive pressure on firms, one would expect to see a decrease in gender discrimination (as in all other forms of discrimination). Importantly, this should be the case in both developed and developing countries, even though it is expected to be stronger in countries (and within sectors) where globalisation has led to sharper increases in competition.
Empirical evidence supports the view that discrimination is more widespread the less competition there is (Hellerstein et al., 2002) . Black and Brainerd (2004) find that increased competition through trade liberalisation has closed the gender gap in wages in the US by reducing a firm's ability to discriminate against women. 4 Artecona and Cunningham (2002) find the same for Mexico, but the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels, as already noted above. Fontana and Wood (2000) come to the conclusion that an increase in foreign investment and an increase in manufactured exports is likely to narrow the gender wage gap according to their computable general equilibrium model of Bangladesh. Berik et al. (2004) , on the other hand, find that increased competition from foreign trade in concentrated industries in South Korea and Taiwan is increasing the gender wage gap, thus contradicting Becker's theory. None of these country case studies can capture general trends, however. Oostendorp (2004) looks at the effect of FDI inflows and trade on the gender wage gap in more than 80 countries, disaggregated by 161 occupations. The results suggest that both FDI and trade decrease the gender wage gap in both rich and poor countries for low-skill, but not for high-skill occupations. The gender gap in high-skill occupations in poor countries might even increase with higher FDI inflows.
Compulsory or forced labour, the other fundamental labour right violation addressed in this article, has seemingly little to do with our discussion so far. However, it can be interpreted as an extreme form of wage discrimination: instead of receiving their marginal product, workers subject to forced or compulsory forms of labour receive only minimal wages, if anything at all. A greater degree of competition from higher integration into globalised markets should therefore reduce the incidence of forced labour similar to the reduction in economic discrimination against women.
Yet, at the same time, the logic that critics of globalisation apply in terms of the detrimental effects of the pressure to cut costs might also lead to an increase in forced labour. As a report by the ILO (2005, p. 63) has put it:
It is now clearer that competitive pressures can have an adverse impact on conditions of employment and, at their extreme, can lead to forced labor. With global pressures on suppliers to reduce costs by every available means, retailers and intermediaries can take advantage of the intense competition between suppliers in order to squeeze profits out of them.
Similarly, Bales (1999, pp. 9f.) argues that forced labour can constitute a 'significant part' of a cost-saving strategy of multinational companies. In addition, he suggests that modernisation and globalisation of the world economy have destroyed family and small-scale subsistence farming, with the consequence that sometimes farmers ended up in forced agricultural labour. The question of whether globalisation has a beneficial or detrimental impact on this aspect of core labour rights is therefore foremost an empirical question, as is the case with economic discrimination of women.
Beside these more direct effects, globalisation might also have an indirect impact on both discrimination and forced labour via institutional and norm convergence. Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that globalisation is about more than just market integration and that it induces integrated countries to harmonise institutional and other regulatory arrangements. Given that developed countries dominate the international economic system and on average grant women better economic rights and have a lower incidence of forced labour, one can expect that their higher standards provide the role model to which countries with lower standards are moving towards. Such policy contagion dynamics working via communication, learning, imitation and altered reputation payoffs are well established in the literature on the diffusion of economic policies in globalised markets (Simmons and Elkins, 2004) . With respect to reputation effects, for example, export-oriented countries with production dominated by foreign investors might find it more difficult to treat women badly or employ forced labour as they are under higher scrutiny by the media, consumers, human rights and other activist non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Since the consumers of the goods produced by foreign investors in many developing countries are located in richer countries, companies are increasingly sensitive to how people perceive their brand name (Fung et al., 2001 ). Bernstein (2001) reports that producers in these countries are starting to subscribe to voluntary codes of conduct of good practice with respect to labour standards. Harrison and Scorse (2005) show how wages increased systematically more in those textiles, footwear and apparel plants in Indonesia in the first half of the 1990s, where civil society activists concentrated their campaign efforts, than they did in other plants.
It is of course possible that economic discrimination against women and the existence of forced labour have feedback effects on a country's position in a globalising world. Foreign investors could be attracted by forced labour or by very low female wages and poor occupational conditions. The same conditions might give certain, mainly developing, countries an additional comparative advantage, particularly in the export of labour-intensive goods. In fact, critics claim that globalisation favours capitalist classes over labour unions. Busse and Spielmann (2005) report evidence that a higher gender wage gap promotes the export of labour-intensive goods, whereas the opposite is the case for gender inequality in labour force activity and educational attainment rates. In a country study of South Korea, Seguino (1997) finds that the gender wage gap can explain some of the country's growth in exports. As concerns FDI, both Kucera (2002) and Busse and Spielmann (2003) find no evidence that greater gender inequality attracts foreign investors. Similarly, Busse and Braun (2003) find no evidence that a higher incidence of forced labour attracts FDI flows, but report that forced labour gives developing countries an additional advantage in the export of labour-intensive goods. While not totally conclusive, these studies suggest the need to control for potential feedback effects. In our estimations, we will tackle this problem with the help of instrumental variable regression analysis.
RESEARCH DESIGN a. Dependent Variables
Our measure of women's economic rights is taken from Cingranelli and Richards' (2004) Human Rights Database. The measure covers the following rights:
• Equal pay for equal work • Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent • The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent • Equality in hiring and promotion practices • Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc.) • Non-discrimination by employers • The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace • The right to work at night • The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous • The right to work in the military and the police force.
Using the annual United States State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices , Cingranelli and Richards code a discrete variable that takes on one of four values based on the following coding scheme (see Cingranelli and Richards, 2004 , for a detailed description of decision rules for coding this variable):
(0) There are no economic rights for women under law, and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women. (1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women.
(2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low level of discrimination against women. (3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.
For forced labour, we have two independent sources. We use both to establish some robustness in the results we obtain. One is taken from Kucera (2001) and is based on various ILO publications and the US State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights . Kucera codes a variable that indicates the existence of forced labour in four economic sectors, namely manufacturing, mining, construction and market-oriented agriculture, forestry or fishing, so that the variable runs from 0 (no evidence in any sector) to 4 (evidence of forced labour in all four sectors). To qualify, there must be evidence of forced labour in one or the other form of:
1. Chattel slavery on behalf of private agents 2. Bonded labour or serfdom on behalf of private agents 3. Other or not specified on behalf of private agents 4. In private prisons or state-run prisons on behalf of private agents 5. In state-run prisons other or not specified 6. Resulting from state policy other than prison labour and 'grey areas'.
The second measure of forced labour is taken from Busse and Braun (2003) . Using information from the US State Department reports as well as Anti-Slavery International and ICFTU (2001), Avery (2002) and ILO (2001) , they look for evidence for one of eight forms of forced labour identified by ILO (2001) , namely slavery and abduction, compulsory participation in public works, coercive recruitment practices in agriculture and remote rural areas, bonded domestic work, debt bondage, exaction of forced labour by the military, trafficking for sexual and economic exploitation and, lastly, prison labour. Dummy variables for evidence of the existence of each form of forced labour are created. These are then summed up with equal weight to give an overall measure of forced labour. There are two exceptions to this rule. First, for trafficking in persons, Busse and Braun (2003) hold that there is enough information in the sources to allow an intermediate coding of 0.5 in addition to 0 and 1. Second, the bonded labour dummy is counted twice in the summation. Busse and Braun (2003, p. 55) justify this rule by saying that 'since bonded labour is the most common form of forced labour, a country that has problems with bonded labor is more likely to use forced labor on a large scale than, for instance, a country in which coercive recruitment systems exist'. The aggregate measure of forced labour therefore runs on a scale from 0 (no evidence for forced labour in any form) to 9 (evidence for forced labour in all eight forms with bonded labour counted twice). The two measures of forced labour are correlated at r = 0.45. This is clearly statistically significant, but perhaps below what one might expect. The less-than-perfect correlation has to do with different coding rules, different sources used, etc. Thus, if we do find similar results using both measures, it will allow us to be somewhat more confident of the robustness of results.
b. Explanatory Variables
Our indicator of the extent of trade openness is the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP (TRADE/GDP). We use general trade openness rather than openness in specific economic sectors because most of the theoretical arguments relate to general trade openness. As our measure of penetration by foreign direct investment we use the accumulated stock of FDI relative to GDP as this measure reflects the lasting impact of such investment accumulated over time rather than the more volatile short-term inward investment flows (FDISTOCK/GDP). Accumulated stock to GDP, rather than flow, also reflects the power of the MNCs over domestic actors for shaping the political agendas of governments because it measures the relative influence of foreign over domestic economic actors (De Soysa and Oneal, 1999) .
Logged per capita income (ln GDPPC) is included since more economically developed countries are likely to have lower economic discrimination against women and a lower incidence of forced labour under the reasonable assumption that these rights are what economists call normal goods, i.e. goods for which demand increases with rising income (data taken from Heston et al., 2002) . Modernisation theory similarly argues that the increase in economic opportunities brought about by higher economic development will make it more difficult for employers to discriminate against women (Forsythe et al., 2000) . Boserup (1970) suggests that the relationship might be non-linear with economic development first providing men with preferential access to economic resources, only benefiting women after a threshold level of economic development has been reached and women start entering the paid workforce. Some feminists even suggest that economic development might increase economic discrimination against women (Charlton, 1997) . In pre-tests we included a squared income term to account for Boserup's hypothesis of non-linear relationship, but did not find it to be statistically significant. For this reason, income enters the estimations reported below only linearly.
To test whether ratification of the relevant ILO conventions has an impact, we include dummy variables of whether a country had ratified the ILO Conventions 100 and 111 (CONVRAT100 and CONVRAT111) for economic discrimination against women as the dependent variable. Similarly, we include dummies for ratification by 1994 of ILO Conventions 29 and 105 for forced labour as the dependent variable (CONVRAT29 and CONVRAT105). This information is provided by the ILO's Database of International Labour Standards (www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/). Whether ratification of these conventions has any effect on the actual behaviour of ratifying countries is highly contested, however. From a realist international relations perspective, ratification of a convention on paper does not mean anything in actual practice unless there are stringent compliance and enforcement mechanisms in place and powerful countries take an interest in enforcing the rules. Countries with poor rights might even be more likely to ratify under these circumstances in the hope that ratification will deflect criticism without any actual change in the human rights position (Neumayer, 2005) . The lack of a strong enforcement and sanctioning mechanism for breach of ILO conventions and the resulting reliance on voluntary compliance is widely noted (Block et al., 2001) .
In a fully democratic society, the preferences of the median voter should determine political outcomes. Since women represent a slight majority in most country's electorate, one would expect that in fully democratic countries women enjoy no worse economic rights than men. Of course, this depends on a fully competitive political system and the majority of policy makers are male in most countries, including democracies. However, one would still expect that democracies grant higher economic rights to women relative to authoritarian regimes. As concerns forced labour, since such labour violates human rights and democracies are often regarded as being more protective of human rights (Poe et al., 1999) , one would expect that democracies have a lower incidence of forced labour. Data on political rights from Freedom House (2004) are taken as our measure of DEMOCRACY. 5 This index is based on expert judgement on the freeness and competitiveness of the electoral process, political participation and political pluralism.
Political economy arguments further suggest partisan effects. Left-wing governments traditionally embrace full economic rights for women as part of their political agenda, whereas conservative parties in many countries hold on to a traditional role model of men as the main breadwinner. Even in Communist countries, where we observe massive violations of other forms of fundamental labour rights such as the freedom of association and collective bargaining, women are typically not much discriminated against in economic life. There is less reason to expect a partisan effect on the existence of forced labour. No political party embraces forced labour as part of their political agenda. As 5 Note that our democracy measure relies on the political rights measure from Freedom House only, as the complementary civil liberties measure includes equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation as part of the criteria used to construct the measure. The original score on Freedom House's measure has been reversed such that higher values mean greater political rights. information for the political orientation of the ruling government, we use a dummy variable from the World Bank's (2002) Database of Political Institutions indicating whether the chief executive's party was of left-wing political orientation (mainly communist, socialist and social democratic parties).
For women's economic rights only, we entered an additional variable capturing the percentage share of Muslims among the population (%MUSLIM), with data taken from La Porta et al. (1999) . This is to account for the fact that in many Muslim societies women are not regarded as equal to men in professional life. Morrisson and Jütting (2005) show that there are important regional differences with respect to social institutions reflecting long-standing norms, customs and traditions such as genital mutilation and dress codes, marriage, parenting, inheritance, ownership and movement rights. To account for these differences, we include regional dummy variables following World Bank (2003) classification for Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Northern Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Northern America in order to capture some crude cultural, historical and other differences. North Africa and the Middle East represent the omitted reference category in the estimations. For forced labour as the dependent variable, we do not include regional dummy variables for two reasons. First, some regions like Northern America do not have any incidence of forced labour according to our two measures, which creates problems for the maximum-likelihood estimator employed. Second, the regional dummy variables make instrumental variable regression estimation in a pure cross-sectional sample extremely inefficient. For these reasons, we include a dummy for OECD countries instead to account for the difference in forced labour between developed and developing countries not captured by our explanatory variables. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary descriptive variable information and a bivariate correlation matrix of the dependent variables and the main explanatory variables. Variance inflation analysis did not suggest reason for concern with multicollinearity problems.
Women's economic rights are measured over a period of time and explanatory variables are therefore annual contemporaneous observations. For forced labour as the dependent variable, which is only available cross-sectionally, the explanatory variables are averages over the years 1990 to 1994. The average is taken to reduce the impact of single years and increase sample size, and the end year is 1994 since the dependent variable derived from Kucera (2001) captures the incidence of forced labour from around the mid-1990s. 
c. Estimation Technique
We estimate the model with women's economic rights as the dependent variable with ordered logit analysis to account for the fact that the variable is not cardinal, but ordinal. The count data nature of the forced labour dependent variable provided by Kucera (2001) suggests usage of an estimation technique that is particularly suitable for count data such as the negative binomial regression. The one provided by Busse and Braun (2003) is not, strictly speaking, a count measure (due to the weighting of two of its sub-components), but it is very close to it, so we also use the negative binomial. For all estimations we use robust standard errors. For the women's economic rights measure, which varies over time as well, we additionally allow observations to be clustered on countries. That is, observations are assumed to be independent only across countries, but not necessarily within countries over time.
As discussed above, it is possible that trade openness and the extent of a country's penetration by FDI as well as per capita income are endogenous to women's economic rights and the existence of forced labour. For this reason, we also use instrumental variable (IV) regression where we instrument for trade and FDI. 7 For women's economic rights as the dependent variable, this is a random-effects IV estimator to account for the cross-sectional time-series nature of the data (there is, unfortunately, too little over-time variation in the dependent variable to allow fixed-effects IV estimation). Note that the IV regressions are based on a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator since there is no easy-to-use routine for IV estimation with either ordered logit or negative binominal regression in STATA, the statistical package used. Our choice of instruments is inspired by the so-called gravity model of international trade and by the literature on the determinants of FDI location. The literature on the determinants of FDI (see Neumayer and Spess, 2005 ) is much less specific and consistent, however, than the gravity model is for trade openness. As instruments we use population 7 Some studies suggest that gender inequality -which is not identical to economic discrimination against women, but correlated with it -has detrimental effects on economic development (Dollar and Gatti, 1999; and Klasen, 1999) while others find the opposite (Seguino, 2000) , which means that the level of per capita income might be endogenous as well. Results are fairly consistent if per capita income is instrumented for as well, using a country's minimum distance to either New York, Rotterdam or Tokyo and a dummy variable for landlocked countries as additional instruments, as suggested by geographical explanations for variation in per capita income. size and size of land area, both in natural logs, a dummy variable, which is set to one if a country shares a common language with one of the countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, and the sum of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed by a country. Data are taken from Hall and Jones (1999) , UNCTAD (2003) and World Bank (2003) . Instruments need to be redundant, relevant and exogenous. Redundant means that they must be known not to affect the dependent variables directly. There is no reason to presume that any of our instruments have a direct effect on either women's economic rights or the existence of forced labour. Relevant means that the instruments are strongly related to the endogenous variables conditional on the other exogenous variables. Exogenous means that the instruments themselves must not be correlated with the error term. Relevance and exogeneity of our instruments are discussed in the next section.
RESULTS
We start with women's economic rights, for which Table 3 provides ordered logit estimation results. Results for the full sample are presented in column I without the regional dummy variables, then in column II with these variables included. Column I suggests that countries that are more open to trade provide better economic rights to women. The stock of FDI does not matter, however. The control variables test in line with expectations: women's economic rights are better in more developed and democratic countries as well as in countries in which the chief executive belongs to a left-wing party, whereas rights are lower in countries with a higher share of Muslims. Ratification of the two relevant ILO conventions does not matter. Adding the regional dummy variables in column II does not change results much. The main difference is that ratification of ILO convention 111 (but not 100) is now associated with better rights. Of course, it is not clear whether ratification leads to better rights in its wake or whether countries with better rights are more likely to ratify.
8 Contingent on the explanatory variables, women enjoy better economic rights in Western Europe and Northern America and worse rights in South Asia than in Northern Africa and the Middle East, the omitted reference category. Repeating the two estimations, but restricting the sample to developing countries only in columns III and IV shows that the results are not much affected and are therefore not driven by the presence of developed countries in the sample.
In Table 4 , the set of estimations from Table 3 is repeated, but employing IV regression analysis. The Cragg-Donald test statistic can tell us whether the instruments are relevant, i.e. whether they are strongly related to the endogenous variables conditional on the other exogenous variables. If instruments are weak, then 2SLS estimation is typically inappropriate. With reference to the critical values for the test reported in Stock and Yogo (2004) , the instruments appear to be very strong in columns I and III and marginally strong in columns II and IV (the difference stemming from regional differences in average trade openness and FDI penetration, which lowers the relevance of the instruments). Are the instruments exogenous? They are clearly not affected by the dependent variables, but for the estimation to be identified it must be the case that they affect the dependent variables only through the endogenous variables and not through any other variable, either included or omitted from the estimation. As concerns the latter, we contest that we have not omitted any variable that theory would call for to be included and that is correlated with the instruments. As concerns the former, we maintain that there is no reason why population size, land area, language and the number of BITs signed should directly impact either per capita income, democracy, the political orientation of the government or any of the remaining variables (other than through trade and FDI). 9 Since the model is over-identified, i.e. we have more instruments than endogenous variables, one can test exogeneity via an over-identification test. The test results reject the exogeneity assumption for the full sample, but fail to reject it for the developing-country-only sample. In either case, the test results are only suggestive due to potentially limited power of the test. In the end, exogeneity always needs to be assumed and, as mentioned already, we see no reason against exogeneity of our instruments.
Turning to the actual estimates, as before, countries more open to trade and countries with a left-wing-oriented chief executive have higher women's economic rights, whereas the opposite is the case for countries with a higher share of Muslim population. The instrumental variable regression estimation in the developing-country-only sample with regional dummy variables included is so inefficient as to render all variables statistically insignificant, except the Muslim population share variable. A higher per capita income is associated with better economic rights for women, but only in column I. For this regression only, a higher FDI stock is negatively and marginally significantly associated with women's rights. The effect might just be down to chance, however, as the coefficient is far from statistical significance in the other columns.
In Table 5 , we turn to the incidence of forced labour. Negative binomial regression results for the measure taken from Kucera (2001) are presented first for the full sample and then for a developing country sample only (columns I and II). Countries that are more open to trade have a lower incidence of forced labour. The opposite is the case for more democratic countries. This result might be surprising, but it does not uphold for the alternative measure of forced labour (see below). Ratification of ILO Convention 29 is positively correlated with 9 Our argument is slightly problematic with respect to democracy. This is because some, like Dahl and Tufte (1974) , argue that a small population size facilitates democratic decision-making. We do not find this argument entirely persuasive as some of the largest countries in the world in terms of population size are well-functioning democracies. Also, the very small island nations, for which the argument has been advanced most forcefully (Anckar and Anckar, 1995) , are not in our sample anyway, due to lack of data on some of the variables. forced labour, but only in column I, whereas ratification of ILO Convention 105 is negatively correlated with forced labour, but only in column II. There is thus no consistent effect. None of the other variables is statistically significant. In columns III and IV the measure taken from Busse and Braun (2003) is taken as the dependent variable. Trade openness remains a predictor of lower forced labour incidence in both samples. OECD countries have a lower forced labour incidence, but the type of political regime no longer matters. Neither do any of the other explanatory variables.
IV regression results are presented in Table 6 . Cragg-Donald test results suggest that the instruments are not particularly strong for these models. For this reason, we use limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) and Fuller's modified LIML estimators instead of 2SLS, as recommended by Stock and Yogo (2004) . Fuller's estimators differ by a parameter a, with a = 1 and a = 4 being the most popular ones. To save space and because forced labour is rare in developed countries, we concentrate on the developing-country-only sample. As with the other set of IV estimations, we see no reason that would speak against the exogeneity of our instruments and the over-identification tests fail to reject the hypothesis of exogeneity. Turning to the results themselves, trade openness remains with a negative coefficient sign throughout and is statistically significant in the majority of estimations; so is now the FDI stock variable for the Busse and Braun measure of forced labour. The ratification of ILO Convention 29 is associated with higher forced labour incidence almost throughout. None of the other variables is statistically significant. In further sensitivity analysis, we replaced the measures of forced labour with a simple dummy variable that was set to one if there was any evidence of forced labour. The reason is that just because forced labour exists in more economic sectors in country A than in country B, this does not necessarily imply that the extent of the problem is any worse in country A than in country B. For example, according to the measure provided by Kucera (2001) , there is evidence of forced labour in all four sectors in Brazil, Pakistan and India, whereas there is evidence of forced labour for only one sector in Myanmar, despite the ILO finding of widespread use of forced labour in this country, as mentioned in the introductory section. Using logit to account for the dichotomous nature of the alternative dependent variables, results are very consistent with the ones using the original count measures of forced labour, implying that the results are not just tainted by the number of sectors in a country.
CONCLUSION
Does globalisation increase the economic discrimination women face in many countries throughout the world? Does it increase the incidence of forced labour? Existing studies, both qualitative and quantitative, have only addressed some aspects of discrimination and have often done so on a case study basis. No general conclusions about the effect of globalisation on the economic discrimination against women can therefore be drawn from existing literature. Furthermore, we know of no existing study that has systematically analysed the link between globalisation and forced or compulsory labour.
Given the inevitable limits of our research design, we can also only offer tentative answers since we can only control for regional, not country fixed effects, in the regressions on women's rights and the sample is purely cross-sectional in the regressions on forced labour. If anything, however, our quantitative analysis of a global sample suggests that women in countries that are more open to trade enjoy better economic rights and there is less incidence of forced labour in countries more integrated into global markets than in countries that are more closed. This effect is robust toward excluding developed countries from the sample and upholds in instrumental variable regression analysis, except that trade openness is not statistically significant for women's economic rights when regional dummy variables are added to instrumental variable regression. It also holds for two independent measures of forced labour incidence with few exceptions.
Contrary to trade openness, we find little evidence that the extent of an economy's penetration with FDI, the second major component of globalisation, has an effect on the dependent variables. There may be several explanations for this. One plausible reason is that the FDI stock to GDP measure for poor, but resource-rich, countries are quite high, but these countries may suffer from aspects of the resource curse where governments make little investment in the modernisation of the economy. Thus, the type of FDI may matter. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive data available on disaggregated types of FDI. Further, the source of FDI may also matter. Future work might examine whether differences exist in FDI coming from Western democratic countries as opposed to FDI from other countries, mainly from East and South-East Asia. Unfortunately, this would lead to a much smaller sample due to lack of bilateral FDI data.
Globalisation is not only driven by trade openness and FDI. Other features of globalisation -for example, easier and cheaper travel and communication possibilities -can increase the incidence of forced labour in the form of sexual and other trafficking of people to developed countries, an aspect that ILO (2001) has termed the 'underside of globalisation'. Clearly, these negative aspects are outside the scope of the present paper's analysis.
This third and final paper concludes our analysis of the effects of globalisation on core or fundamental labour rights. In Neumayer and De Soysa (2005a) , we demonstrate that countries that are more open to trade and are more strongly penetrated by FDI have a lower incidence of child labour. In Neumayer and De Soysa (2005b) , we employ a new measure of free association and collective bargaining rights and find that countries that are more open to trade have fewer violations of labour rights than more closed ones, whereas FDI has no statistically significant impact. It is entirely possible of course, perhaps even likely, that globalisation boosts the bargaining power of capital at the expense of labour, which would put downward pressure on outcome-related labour standards such as wages, working times and other employment conditions. These have not been the subjects of our analyses. When it comes to core or fundamental labour rights, however, globalisation seems to have beneficial rather than harmful effects.
